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Abstract
This paper discusses the magnitude of Nonperforming Loans (“NPLs”) in the 
banking sector of Bangladesh since the adoption of prudential norms in the 
loan classiﬁcation and provisioning system in 1990. The paper reveals that the 
presence of an alarming amount of NPLs both in the Nationalized Commercial 
Banks (NCBs) and in the Development Financial Institutions (DFIs), along 
with maintenance of inadequate loan loss provisions, diminishes the overall 
credit quality of Bangladesh. Poor enforcement of laws relating to settlement 
of NPLs, followed by insufﬁcient debt recovery measures on the part of the 
banks, has also aggravated the ﬁnancial malaise, although a decrease in NPLs 
is noticed since the year 2000. The paper suggests that the prevention of the 
‘ﬂow problem of bad loans’ accompanied by other resolution measures might 
help to sort out the nonperforming loan mess in Bangladesh.
Keywords:  Loan classification system, nonperforming loans, commercial banks, 
enforcement status of loans, loan recovery measures, Bangladesh.
Introduction
Nonperforming loans (“NPLs”) refer to those financial assets from which banks no 
longer receive interest and/or installment payments as scheduled. They are known as 
non-performing because the loan ceases to “perform” or generate income for the bank. 
Choudhury et al. (2002: 21-54) state that the nonperforming loan is not a “uniclass” 
but rather a “multiclass” concept, which means that NPLs can be classified into 
different varieties usually based on the “length of overdue” of the said loans. NPLs 
are viewed as a typical byproduct of financial crisis: they are not a main product of 
the lending function but rather an accidental occurrence of the lending process, one 
that has enormous potential to deepen the severity and duration of ﬁnancial crisis and 
to complicate macro economic management (Woo, 2000: 2). This is because NPLs 
can bring down investors’ confidence in the banking system, piling up unproductive 
economic resources even though depreciations are taken care of, and impeding the 
resource allocation process. 
In a bank-centered ﬁnancial system, NPLs can further thwart economic recovery 
by shrinking operating margin and eroding the capital base of the banks to advance new 
loans. This is sometimes referred to as “credit crunch” (Bernanke et al., 1991: 204-248). 
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In addition, NPLs, if created by the borrowers willingly and left unresolved, might act 
as a contagious ﬁnancial malaise by driving good borrowers out of the ﬁnancial market.1 
Further, Muniappan (2002: 25-26) argues that a bank with high level of NPLs is forced 
to incur carrying costs on non-income yielding assets that not only strike at proﬁtability 
but also at the capital adequacy of a bank, and in consequence, the bank faces difﬁculties 
in augmenting capital resources. Bonin and Huang (2001: 197-214) also state that the 
probability of banking crises increases if ﬁnancial risk is not eliminated quickly. Such 
crises not only lower living standards but can also eliminate many of the achievements 
of economic reform overnight. The economic and ﬁnancial implications of NPLs in a 
bank-centered ﬁnancial economy can be best explained by the following diagram:
Fig. 1 Economic and ﬁnancial implications of NPLs
1 If NPLs are not properly addressed, bad borrowers can create a negative psychological impact on good 
borrowers to prolong their payments. This situation becomes worse in an economy where enforcement 
status of laws is seen as very weak. 
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Fig. 1 Economic and financial implications of NPLs The above ﬁgure illustrates the catastrophic effect of NPLs in a bank-centered 
financial system. Having such a system, Bangladesh needs to study the condition of 
NPLs on a routine basis in order to augment investible capital in the productive sectors 
as well as to ensure sustainable economic growth.  
It can be said unequivocally that NPLs are the result of economic slowdown. For 
instance, Cargill et al. (2004: 125-147), Barseghyan (2003: 12), Fukui (2003), Shiozaki 
(2002: 27), Hoshino (2002: 3-19), Takeuchi (2001: 37-38) have identiﬁed Japan’s high 
level of NPLs as an outcome of prolonged economic stagnation and deflation in the 
economy since the bursting of the “bubble” in the early 1990s. In addition, Hanazaki 
et. al. (2002: 305-325) and Yanagisawa (2001: 2-9) highlight cross-shareholdings, stock 
market volatility, virtual blanket guarantee of bank debts and the system of “relationship 
banking”2 as factors responsible for the prolonged fragility of the Japanese banking 
1 If NPLs are not properly addressed, bad borrowers can create a negative psychological impact on good 
borrowers to prolong their payments. This situation becomes worse in an economy where enforcement 
status of laws is seen as very weak.
2 “Relationship banking” - a system wherein banks maintain intimate relationships with their client ﬁrms. 
This system gives bank managers substantial room for manipulating accounting figures on NPLs and 
capital bases if not strongly veriﬁed by law enforcing agencies.
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sector. According to the deﬁnition of the Financial Reconstruction Law (FRL), the total 
amount of NPLs of all banks in Japan as of the end of March 2003 was 35.3 trillion yen, 
although there are claims that the actual amount of NPLs might exceed 100 trillion yen. 
On the other hand, the causes of the ﬁnancial and exchange rate crisis that erupted in 
East Asia (Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia) in 1997 are viewed as high short-
term external debts, excessive loans for real estate, large current account deposits, high 
international interest rates and weaknesses in the balance sheet of ﬁnancial institutions. 
In addition, Kwack (2000: 195-206) finds that the 3-month LIBOR interest rate and 
nonperforming loan rates of banks were the major determinants of the Asian ﬁnancial 
crisis. Huang and Yang (1998: 11) report that unlike the other countries of East Asia, 
China did not face ﬁnancial fragility because of the size of its foreign exchange reserve, 
its current account surplus, the dominance of foreign direct investment in capital ﬂows 
and the control of the capital account. As of June 2003, China recorded only 5.68% of 
its total loans as nonperforming while, in contrast, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and 
Malaysia record NPLs at 15.29%, 8%, 15% and 8.7% respectively. Unfortunately, the 
present (December, 2005) rate of NPLs in China has increased to 8.6%.
 In the Indian subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal), 
however, the causes of nonperforming loans are usually attributed to the lack of effective 
monitoring and supervision on the part of banks (as required by the BASEL principles 
of bank monitoring and supervisions), lack of effective lenders’ recourse, weaknesses of 
legal infrastructure, and lack of effective debt recovery strategies. Among the countries 
in the Indian sub-continent, the rate of NPLs as a percentage of total loans disbursed in 
2005 is seen to be minimal in India (5.2%), followed by Sri Lanka (9.6%). Bangladesh, 
however, still records a staggering rate of 13.56%.
The issue of nonperforming loans in Bangladesh is not a new phenomenon. In 
fact, the seeds were cultivated during the early stage of the liberation period (1972-1981), 
by the government’s “expansion of credit” policies on the one hand and a feeble and 
inﬁrm banking infrastructure combined with an unskilled work force on the other (Islam 
et al., 1999: 35-37). Moral et al. (2000: 13-27) argue that the expansion of credit policy 
during the early stage of liberation, which was directed to disbursement of credit on 
relatively easier terms, did actually expand credit in the economy on nominal terms. 
However, it also generated a large number of willful defaulters in the background who, 
later on, diminished the ﬁnancial health of banks through the “sick industry syndrome”.3
 Islam et al. (1999: 22-31) add that despite the liberalizing and privatizing of the 
banking sectors in the 1980s with a view to increasing efﬁciency and competition, the 
robustness of the credit environment deteriorated further because of the lack of effective 
lenders’ recourse on borrowers. Choudhury et al. (1999: 57) find that Government 
direction towards nationalized commercial banks to lend to unprofitable state owned 
enterprises, limited policy guidelines (banks were allowed to classify their assets at their 
own judgments) regarding “loan classiﬁcation and provisioning”4, and the use of accrual 
policies of accounting for recording interest income of NPLs resulted in malignment of 
the credit discipline of the country till the end of 1989. 
3 This phenomenon was observed in the mid-1980s. This is not a sunset industry but created by borrowers 
willfully. 
4 Loan classiﬁcation refers to the process banks use to review their loan portfolios and assign loans to 
categories or grades based on the perceived risk and other relevant characteristics of the loans (Finance 
Forum, 2002). Provisioning is a method that banks use to set aside funds against possible loan loss.
? ?? ?
In the 1990s, however, a broad based financial measure was undertaken in 
the name of FSRP5, enlisting the help of World Bank to restore ﬁnancial discipline to 
the country.  Since then, the banking sector has adopted “prudential norms” for loan 
classification and provisioning. Other laws, regulations and instruments such as loan 
ledger account, lending risk analysis manual, performance planning system, interest 
rate deregulation, the Money Loan Court Act 1990 have also been enacted to promote 
sound, robust and resilient banking practice. Surprisingly, even after so many measures, 
the banking system of Bangladesh is yet to free itself from the grip of the NPL 
debacle. The question thus arises, what are the reasons behind such a large proportion 
of nonperforming loans in the economy of Bangladesh? Is it because of “flexibility 
in deﬁning NPLs” or lack of effective “recovery strategies” on the part of the banks? 
Alternatively, is it due to poor enforcement status of laws related to nonperforming 
loans? The present study has concentrated on the above issues mainly with a view to 
assisting policymakers to formulate concrete measures regarding sound management of 
NPLs in Bangladesh. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with the current loan 
classification and provisioning system in use in Bangladesh with a view to 
understanding the country’s system of classification of NPLs as compared to the 
international standard.  Section 3 traverses the different varieties of NPLs (substandard, 
doubtful and bad). Section 4 discusses the enforcement status of laws relating to default 
loans in Bangladesh. It needs to be mentioned that in a bank-centered ﬁnancial system, 
the central bank plays an important role in the governance of banks. Therefore, an 
attempt is made in section 5 to understand the measures undertaken by the central bank 
in relation to the management of NPLs in Bangladesh. Section 6 provides a summary of 
the ﬁndings and the major challenges to addressing the NPL problem, while concluding 
remarks are given in section 7 of this paper. 
Loan classiﬁcation system in use in Bangladesh
Since 1989, Bangladesh follows both “overdue criteria” and “qualitative criteria” to 
deem a loan classiﬁed or unclassiﬁed.  According to overdue criteria, as suggested by 
Bangladesh Bank, bank managers usually divide all loans into ﬁve categories (continuous 
loan, demand loan, term loan payable within five years, term loan payable in more 
than five years and short-term agricultural credit / micro credit), and then observe 
periods elapsed for repayments. All troubled loans are then further reclassified as 
special mention account (SMA)6, substandard, doubtful and bad/losses to comply with 
international norms of loan classiﬁcation. Further, in order to keep the management up 
to date about the status of loans, bank managers review the loan quality on a quarterly 
basis.  With some exceptions, the banking sector at present follows a norm of six 
months overdue for deeming a loan nonperforming.  The rate of provision on classiﬁed 
loans follows norms of 5%, 20%, 50% and 100% against special mention accounts, 
substandard, doubtful, and bad/loss loans respectively. The current loan classification 
and provisioning system (in a summary form) in use in Bangladesh is shown below in 
Table 1.
5 Financial sector reform project (FSRP) was launched under financial sector adjustment credit of the 
World Bank in early 1990s.
6 The special mention account (SMA) classiﬁcation was introduced in Bangladesh from the beginning of 
the year 2006.
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Table 1 Current loan classiﬁcation and provisioning system in Bangladesh
Type of Loan Period overdue Status of classiﬁ-cation Rate of provision
Continuous Loan 
(OD/CC, PC, LIM, LTR etc.). 
Overdue period will be counted 
from the day following the date 
of expiry of such loan.
?
?Less than 6 months
?
??3 months or more but less than 6 
months?
??6 months or more but less than 9 
months?
??9 months or more but less than 12 
months?
?More than 12 months
Unclassiﬁed
SMA
Sub-standard
Doubtful
Bad/Loss
1% (except SE&CF)
2% (for SE&CF)
5%
20%
50%
100%
Demand Loan
(Forced LIM, BLC/ PAD, IBP, 
FBP etc.). Overdue period 
will be counted from the day 
following the date of expiry of 
such loan.
?
?Less than 6 months
?
??3 months or more but less than 6 
months?
??6 months or more but less than 9 
months?
??9 months or more but less than 12 
months?
?More than 12 months
Unclassiﬁed
SMA
Sub-standard
Doubtful
Bad/Loss
1% (except SE&CF)
2% (for SE&CF)
5%
20%
50%
100%
Term Loan Payable Within 5 
Years
Overdue period will be counted 
from the day following the ex-
piry of the due date of payment 
of installment of such loan.
?
?Less than 6 months?
??If the default amount of install-
ment is equal to or more than the 
installment payable in 3 months
?
??If the default amount of install-
ment is equal to the installment 
payable in 6 months?
??If the default amount of install-
ment is equal to the installment 
payable in 12 months?
??If the default amount of install-
ment is equal to the installment 
payable in 18 months
Unclassiﬁed?
SMA
Sub-standard
Doubtful
Bad/Loss
1% (except SE&CF)
2% (for SE&CF)
5%
20%
50%
100%
Term Loan Payable in More 
Than 5 Years
Overdue period will be counted 
from six (6) months following 
the expiry of the due date of 
payment of the installment of 
such loan
?
??If the overdue amount of install-
ment is equal to or more than the 
installment payable in 3 months 
but less than 12 months.?
??If the default amount of install-
ment is equal to the installment 
payable in 12 months?
??If the default amount of install-
ment is equal to the installment 
payable in 18 months?
??If the default amount of install-
ment is equal to the installment 
payable in 24 months
SMA
Sub-standard
Doubtful
Bad/Loss
5%
20%
50%
100%
STAC /  Micro Credit
Overdue period will be counted 
from six (6) months following 
the expiry of the due date of 
payment of the installment of 
such loan
?
?Less than 12 months?
??12 months or more but less than 
36 months?
??36 months or more but less than 
60 months?
?More than 60 months
Unclassiﬁed
Sub-standard
Doubtful
Bad/Loss
5%
5%
5%
100%
Source:  Banking Regulation & Policy Department circular no. 34, 16, 9 and 14. 
Financial Sector Review, May 2006, Bangladesh Bank.  SE & CF: Small 
Enterprise and Consumer Financing.
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??According to the qualitative judgment criteria, bank managers classify any loan if it 
forecasts the uncertainty of recovery of the loan due to the following reasons:
a.??Credit extended without approval of competent authority or without any logical 
basis (under pressure).
b.?Incomplete documentation.
c.? Insufﬁcient security or drastic fall in the value of security.
d.? Borrower sustains heavy loss in capital due to natural calamity or business 
condition.
e.? Frequent overdraw of limit
f.?Rescheduling terms are not maintained. 
g.?Borrower cannot be traced or death of the borrower.
h.?Filing a suit against the borrower for recovery of credit.
International standard of loan classiﬁcation and the status of Bangladesh 
Being a member country of the World Bank, Bangladesh needs to compare its loan 
classification and provisioning system with the international standard. In order 
to facilitate the same, the standard international system of loan classification and 
provisioning is shown below in Table 2.
Table 2  Loan classiﬁcation system (international standard)
Period overdue
Status of 
classiﬁcation
Rate of 
provision
Frequency of 
classiﬁcation
 Less than 3 months Unclassiﬁed 1% - 5%
At least quarterly, 
usually monthly.
Loans overdue for 3 months but less 
than 6 months
Substandard 10% - 25%
Loans overdue for 6 months but less 
than 9 months
Doubtful 50%-75%
Loans overdue for 9 months or more Bad/loss 100%
Source: Studies in Bangladesh Banking: Series 1, Page 67. 
In comparison to the international standard of loan classification and 
provisioning, it is found that the banking system of Bangladesh follows 4 stages (SMA, 
sub-standard, doubtful, bad and loss) to deﬁne the status of a classiﬁed loan, as opposed 
to three stages (sub-standard, doubtful, bad and loss) used in the international standard. 
While the international standard provides the norm of 3 months overdue for terming 
a loan substandard, this period is used in Bangladesh as the norm for terming a loan 
a “special mention account”. In addition, Bangladesh shows more flexibility than the 
international standard in the classification of long-term loans. However, in the case 
of provisioning and frequency of classification, Bangladesh follows the international 
standard to a great extent. In the final analysis, it can be concluded that the present 
loan classification and provisioning system in use in Bangladesh is similar to a great 
extent to the international standard, although it is yet to adopt the international standard 
completely. 
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Base for provisioning and accounting treatment of NPLs
The bank managers of Bangladesh deduct the amount of interest suspended and the 
value of “eligible securities”7 from the outstanding amount in order to determine the 
base for provisioning to NPLs. For unclassified loans, however, they keep a general 
provision (1%) against the outstanding amount and include it in the capital to determine 
the capital adequacy of the bank (at present 9%). With regard to income recognition, as 
the banking sector follows IAS 308 for preparing ﬁnancial statements, bank managers 
do not consider the amount of interest on substandard and doubtful loans as income for 
the bank, but rather keep it separately in an “interest suspense account”. However, if any 
amount is received against sub-standard and doubtful loans, the said amount is deducted 
from the total interest suspense amount. In the case of a bad/loss loan, the interest on 
such loan is also kept in the interest suspense account if a suit is filed in the court. 
Seemingly, with regard to substandard and doubtful loans, this interest is also excluded 
from the income of the bank. These accounting measures have made the banking sector 
more transparent and credible than they were in the past.
Realities of NPLs in Bangladesh
The most important aspect of this study is to measure the magnitude of loans classiﬁed 
substandard, doubtful and bad/loss since the adoption of criteria for overdue loan 
classification in 1990. In connection to this, it must be mentioned that the banking 
system in Bangladesh (as of December, 2003) comprises four types of scheduled banks 
– 4 nationalized commercial banks (NCBs), 5 government-owned development ﬁnancial 
institutions (DFIs), 30 private commercial banks (PCBs) and 10 foreign commercial 
banks (FCBs) – for catering to the credit needs of the economy. Therefore, data on 
classiﬁed loans in both the banking sector as a whole and in different clusters of banks 
are taken into account to gain a clearer picture of the NPL issue.
Status of total loans, total NPLs and NPLs as a percentage of total loans for all banks 
(1990-2005) 
The ratio of NPLs to total loans in the banking system in Bangladesh has shown a 
sliding downtrend since the year 2000. After increasing steadily from 26.09% in 1990 
to a peak of 41.11% in 1999, the ratio of NPLs to total loans fell to 31.49% in the year 
2000, 22.1% in 2003 and 13.55% in 2005 (Table 3). In contrast, the sub-standard loan 
as a percentage of total NPLs increased by 1.4% in 2005 as compared to 2004, marking 
the end of a declining trend since 1997, with the exception of the year 2003. However, 
in the case of doubtful loans, a longer declining trend has observed since the adoption 
of prudential norms in 1990, except in the years 2003 and 2005 (Table 3). In 2005, 
doubtful loans increased by 0.36% as opposed to 6.6% in 2004. A more alarming picture 
is observed in the case of bad/loss loans, which account for more than 80% of NPLs 
since the year 1997 (at present, 84.37%). Unfortunately, this trend has not shown any 
7 Eligible securities include certiﬁcate of deposits, gold and gold ornaments, government bonds / savings 
certiﬁcates, easily marketable goods and land & buildings.
8 IAS stands for International Accounting Standard. IAS 30 deals with the preparation of the bank’s 
ﬁnancial statement. Bangladesh adopted this standard in 2000.
? ?? ?
improvement over the period 1990 to 2005. It is also to be mentioned that with regard 
to the comparison of NPLs with neighbor countries, Bangladesh exhibits a higher level 
on NPLs than either India or Sri Lanka (Table 4). While NPLs to total loans in India 
declined from 11.4% in 2001 to 5.2% in 2005, NPLs still account for 13.6% of all loans 
in Bangladesh. This staggering rate of bad loans in fact reﬂects the incapability of the 
banking sector to arrest the growth of NPLs, although an encouraging trend of declining 
NPLs has been noticed recently.  
Table 3  Status of classiﬁed loans: sub-standard, doubtful and bad/loss loans of all 
banks  (1990-2005)
(Taka in billion)
Year
Total
loans
Total
classiﬁed
loans
Classiﬁed loans as 
% of total loans
Sub-
standard loan as 
% of TCL
Doubtful
loans as % of TCL
Bad/loss
loans as % of TCL
1990 177.12 46.21 26.09 N.A N.A N.A
1991 185.60 46.54 25.00 N.A N.A N.A
1992 214.36 65.74 30.67 N.A N.A N.A
1993 244.28 85.16 34.86 N.A N.A N.A
1994 262.88 91.56 34.85 19.22 17.60 63.19
1995 310.29 99.42 32.04 13.08 12.36 74.56
1996 351.00 110.54 31.49 13.42 12.27 74.31
1997 462.27 173.32 37.49 7.88 11.70 80.42
1998 527.32 214.37 40.65 4.26 7.21 88.53
1999 580.83 238.79 41.11 5.26 8.27 86.47
2000 654.42 228.51 34.91 4.82 6.33 88.57
2001 749.49 235.99 31.49 7.93 5.48 86.60
2002 851.73 238.57 28.01 8.56 5.09 86.35
2003 914.90 203.2 22.1 10.24 8.75 80.97
2004 1079.71 190.03 17.6 7.2 6.6 86.19
2005 1292.51 175.14 13.56 8.66 6.96 84.37
Source:  Banking Regulation & Policy Department, Bangladesh Bank, 2005; various 
annual reports of Bangladesh Bank.
Note 1:  a. DFIs have been included in the classiﬁcation system from 1997.
b. In 1997, DFIs comprise BKB, BSB and RAKUB.
c. In 1998, BSRS was included in the above list.
d. In 1999, BASIC was included in the above list.
e.  Data corresponding to calendar years 1990 – 1996 include all banks except 
DFIs
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Table 4 Nonperforming loan as a percentage of total loans for selected Asian 
countries
Year
Bangladesh India Sri Lanka
December 2005 March 2005 June 2005
2001 31.5 11.4 15.3
2002 28.1 10.4 15.3
2003 22.1 8.8 13.7
2004 17.6 7.2 9.1
2005 13.6 5.2 9.6
Source:  Global financial stability report, IMF and Bangladesh Bank. Financial Sector 
Review, May 2006, Bangladesh Bank
Trend in classiﬁed loans as a percentage of total loans for different clusters of banks 
(1990-2005)
It was stated earlier that the banking sector of Bangladesh comprises of four types of 
scheduled banks: NCBs, PCBs, FCBs and DFIs. Therefore, in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the magnitude of NPLs in the banking system of Bangladesh, the ratio 
of NPLs to total loans in all these scheduled banks must be examined. It is observed 
that with respect to the ratio of NPLs to total loans in the year 2005, DFIs are in the 
worst position (34.87%), followed by NCBs (21.35%) (Table 5). While the NPL ratio of 
NCBs showed an increasing trend from 27.59% in 1990 to 45.62% in 1999 and then a 
declining trend to 21.35% in 2005, DFIs were not able to change their position markedly 
as NPLs continued to account for 42.8% in 2004 (Table 5). However, the percentage of 
NPLs to total loans both in PCBs and FCBs showed a substantial declining trend since 
1998. In 1998, the NPL ratio of PCBs and FCBs was 32.72% and 4.14% respectively; 
the same declined to 5.62% and 1.26% respectively in 2005 (Table 5).  In the final 
analysis, it can be concluded that the performance of DFIs and NCBs are basically 
maligning the overall banking performance of Bangladesh, although improvements have 
been observed for the last half-decade. 
Table 5  Trend of nonperforming loans as a percentage of total loans for different 
clusters of banks (1990-2002)
Year NCBs PCBs FCBs DFIs
1990 27.59 23.73 20.65 NA
1991 26.30 34.20 11.87 NA
1992 31.86 31.10 12.64 NA
1993 32.23 44.42 10.46 NA
1994 32.12 44.53 8.89 NA
1995 31.00 39.43 5.40 NA
1996 32.55 34.77 4.72 NA
1997 36.57 31.42 3.58 65.72
1998 40.38 32.72 4.14 66.70
1999 45.62 27.09 3.80 65.02
2000 38.56 22.01 3.38 62.56
2001 37.02 16.98 3.32 61.80
2002 33.73 16.38 2.61 56.19
2003 29.0 12.4 2.7 47.4
2004 25.3 8.5 1.3 42.8
2005 21.35 5.62 1.26 34.87
Source: Banking Regulation & Policy Department, Bangladesh Bank, 1995-2005. 
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NPL ratio of banks by type of loans as well as ﬂow of NPLs 
An analysis of the aggregate NPLs in clusters of banks and types of loans in 2005 
indicates that the highest ratio of NPLs is in the category of micro and agricultural 
loans of NCBs (47.09%). This is followed by term loans over a maturity of 5 years 
(42.68%) for DFIs. DFIs also record a staggering rate of 40.45% NPLs in case of term 
loans having a maturity of 5 years, followed by NCBs which have 33.83% NPLs for 
such loans. However, in the case of continuous loans and demand loans, NCBs have the 
largest ratios of NPLs (19.95% and 10.21% respectively) among the bank clusters in 
December 2005 (Table 6). Therefore, it can be concluded that non-performing loans in 
the sector of micro and agricultural loans, as well as term loans of NCBs and DFIs, are 
aggravating the NPL situation of Bangladesh.  
With regard to the flow of classified loans, it is observed that among the new 
outstanding loans disbursed in the year 2001, the rate of classiﬁed loans on 31 March 
2006 was much higher for all banks than in 2005. In the case of NCBs, the proportion 
of classiﬁed loans in relation to total loans disbursed in the year 2001 was 24% on 31 
March 2006. However, as of the same date, the proportion was less than 1% for loans 
disbursed in 2005. The flow of NPLs for FCBs and DFIs has also shown a declining 
trend over the period 2001 to 2005, with some exceptions.
Fig. 2  The Flow of Classiﬁed Loans
Source: Financial Sector Review, May 2006, Bangladesh Bank. Source: Financial Sector Review, May 2006, Bangladesh Bank. 
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Table 6  NPL percentage ratio by type of loans and bank clusters (December 2005)
Bank types Continuous loans Demand loans
Term loans Micro and 
agriculture loansUp to 5 years Over 5 years
NCBs 19.95 10.21 33.83 24.54 47.09
PCBs 6.43 3.83 5.91 5.37 2.03
FCBs 2.31 0.78 0.9 0.49 0
DFIs 18.44 5.26 40.45 42.68 39.20
Total 11.06 6.26 13.20 19.56 41.80
Source:  Annual report 2004-05, Bangladesh Bank; Financial Sector Review, May 2006, 
Bangladesh Bank.
 
Growth rate of advances and classiﬁed loans for all clusters of banks   
It is evident that in 2005, the growth rate of advances is the highest in NCBs (19%), 
followed by FCBs (13.06%). Prior to 2005, however, PCBs played a leading role for a 
number of years (Table 7).  NCBs also show an increasing trend in advances since 1999, 
whilst DFIs show a declining rate of growth, except for the years 2001 and 2005. In 
order to compare the growth rate of classiﬁed loans to the growth rate of advances, it is 
observed that the growth rate of classiﬁed loans of NCBs up to the year 1999 was higher 
than the growth rate of advances, with the exception of a few cases. However, after 
1999, a declining trend is found for all clusters of banks, PCBs, FCBs and DFIs, except 
in a few cases (Table 7). Presently in 2005, the growth rate of classiﬁed loans is found 
to be lower than the growth rate of advances for all clusters of banks in general and in 
total. Therefore, it can be said that the banks belonging to different clusters have made 
progress with respect to the arrest of classiﬁed loans since the year 2000.
Table 7  Growth rates of advances and classified loans for all clusters of banks 
(1997-2005)
Year
NCBs PCBs FCBs DFIs All Banks
GRA GRCL GRA GRCL GRA GRCL GRA GRCL GRA GRCL
1992 10.34 33.64 24.82 60.43 33.66 42.28 - - 15.50 41.25
1993 15.61 16.94 11.13 58.71 10.23 -8.79 - - 13.96 29.54
1994 3.79 3.46 13.86 14.11 20.06 1.04 - - 7.62 7.52
1995 16.58 12.51 17.21 3.79 39.91 -14.25 - - 18.03 8.58
1996 13.47 19.14 12.65 -0.65 12.12 -2.01 - - 13.12 11.19
1997 11.74 25.54 13.70 2.74 17.96 -10.43 - - 31.70 56.78
1998 9.38 20.78 12.53 17.20 16.30 34.42 33.28 35.27 14.07 23.69
1999 6.09 19.87 17.73 -2.55 11.13 2.13 9.87 7.11 10.15 11.39
2000 7.69 -8.99 25.69 2.11 13.52 .84 4.48 .53 12.67 -4.31
2001 8.54 4.20 28.11 -1.17 10.31 8.70 5.98 4.68 14.53 3.28
2002 9.32 -0.39 24.48 20.08 24.86 -2.14 1.67 -7.56 13.64 1.10
2003 0.84 -13.21 15.5 -23.21 16.91 21.42 4.94 -11.49 7.42 -14.83
2004 8.01 -5.77 47.1 -11.41 16.47 -34.70 -4.54 -13.60 18.01 -6.48
2005 19.37 .62 12.28 -25.76 13.06 -5.45 12.65 -8.42 19.70 -7.83
Source:  Banking Regulation & Policy Department, Bangladesh Bank (BB), 1995- 2005; 
Annual reports of BB.
Note: Data corresponding to calendar years 1990 – 1996 include all banks except DFIs.
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Provisioning surplus / shortfall 
One of the important aspects of the prudential norms of banking is the requirement of 
maintaining provisions against default loans. An analysis of the loan loss provisions of 
different clusters of banks reveals that each cluster of banks, excepting FCBs, has failed 
to book the required level of provisions since the adoption of prudential norms in 1990. 
At present (2005), the provisioning shortfall of NCBs is found to be 24.97% followed 
by PCBs at 13.22%. For both NCBs and PCBs, provisioning shortfalls have reached 
alarming levels in the last couple of years, although a slight improvement is observed 
in case of PCBs (Table 8). This provisioning shortfall position depicts erosion of banks’ 
capital, one of the inherent weaknesses of the banking system in Bangladesh.
Table 8 Trend of provisioning surplus/ shortfall as a percentage of total required 
provision for all clusters of banks (1990-2005)
Year NCBs PCBs FCBs DFIs All Banks
1990 -83.12 -66.79 -4.59 NA -76.65
1991 -7.24 -64.21 9.51 NA -20.59
1992 -31.72 -35.21 3.13 NA -31.97
1993 -25.09 -66.65 4.40 NA -39.51
1994 -33.05 -54.26 3.20 NA -39.82
1995 -51.19 -53.20 20.40 NA -50.69
1996 -51.18 -45.61 22.46 NA -49.41
1997 -54.75 -43.89 33.61 -12.49 -42.91
1998 -61.54 -45.58 32.41 -17.92 47.62
1999 -64.11 -39.23 21.45 -10.74 -48.03
2000 -62.65 -27.27 22.58 4.20 -41.74
2001 -65.23 -23.04 24.17 -2.13 -43.28
2002 -69.21 -18.10 27.64 1.22 -44.22
2003 -93.4 -24.6 25.2 -0.8 -59.7
2004 -93.3 -17 23.1 -8.1 -59.1
2005 -24.97 -13.22 43.64 30.74 -51.80
Source: Banking Regulation & Policy Department, Bangladesh Bank, 1995-2005
Enforcement status of laws relating to the default loans in Bangladesh
There is a famous maxim “justice delayed is justice denied”. This can be applied to 
banks, especially in developing countries like Bangladesh, owing to the presence of 
corruption and opaqueness in the settlement process as well as poor enforcement of laws 
that usually create a fertile ground for the willful defaulters. In the case of Bangladesh, 
although several laws have been enacted and amended with a view to ensuring the safety 
and soundness of the banking system, the banking sector still witnesses an alarming 
amount of NPLs. Therefore, it would be meaningful to measure the actual performance 
of different courts in terms of number of suits filed, rate of settlement and rate of 
recovery of NPLs over the years. 
The performance of Artha Rin Adalat
The Artha Rin Adalat Act was enacted in 1990 to address separately all issues related to 
NPLs, with the objective of ensuring the safety and soundness of the banking system. 
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An analysis of the performance of this court reveals that the number of suits filed, 
amounts claimed and number of settled suits have all increased considerably from 1991 
to 2004 (Table 9). It is also encouraging that the percentage of settled suits has increased 
considerably from 11.59% in 1991 to 37.71% in 2001, then to 43.30% in 2004. 
Unfortunately, the recovery rate is seen to be very slow and is conﬁned to 6%-8% only 
during the last several years. Thus, the slow execution of the decrees in Bangladesh can 
be seen as the main factoring contributing to very low recovery of NPLs.
Table 9  Statement of Suits Filed and Settled in Artha Rin Adalat from 1991 to 2004 
(All Banks)
(Tk. in Crore)
Year
No. of suits
ﬁled
Amount
claimed
No. of settled suits
Amount
recovered
% of settled
suits
Recovery
rate
1991 23010 1479.18 2667 54.06 11.59 3.65
1992 28524 2262.77 4418 85.12 15.49 3.76
1993 33961 2802.21 6144 127.20 18.09 4.54
1994 38995 3444.49 7854 181.82 20.14 5.28
1995 42789 4071.12 9726 237.50 22.73 5.83
1996 45777 4838.72 12647 313.94 27.63 6.49
1997 51802 5765.34 14862 387.21 28.69 6.72
1998 56304 6936.87 17181 492.60 30.51 7.10
1999 60190 8270.06 19857 575.37 32.99 6.96
2000 65569 9373.92 22025 717.72 33.59 7.66
2001 69014 10562.07 26024 934.62 37.71 8.85
2002 74073 11027.58 29834 1163.01 40.27 10.55
2003 79367 14185.37 35412 1398.16 44.61 9.86
2004 89747 19018.34 38856 1563.88 43.30 8.22
Source:  Banking Regulation and Policy Department (BRPD), Bangladesh Bank, 
2001-2005. 
The performance of the Bankruptcy Act and the PDR Act 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1997 was formulated in order to assist the recovery environment 
and to enable speedy recovery of NPLs in Bangladesh. An analysis of the performance 
of the bankruptcy court shows that the recovery rate is only 1.12% against Tk. 254662 
crore in 2005 (Table 10). The recovery rate of cases settled through the PDR court is 
also seen to be unsatisfactory (46.02%), although it shows  better performance than 
other courts. Therefore, the main hindrance relating to the recovery of default loans 
at this moment seems to be the poor enforcement status of laws and slow execution 
of decrees. In this connection, it must be mentioned that the law itself is not solely 
responsible for delay in settlement of cases related to NPLs; rather, a number of parties 
such as plaintiffs or complainants, defendants, lawyers and judges are also involved in 
the process.
? ?? ?
Table 10 Status of Suits Filed and Settled in the Bankruptcy Court, PDR Act and 
other Courts as of 30 June 2005
(Tk. in Crore)
Name of the Courts
No. of suits 
ﬁled
Amount 
claimed
No. of
settled suits
Amount 
recovered
% of
settled suits
Recovery rate
Bankruptcy Court 464 254662 155 2874 33.40 1.12
P.D.R. Act 647424 96957 468225 44626 72.32 46.02
Source: BRPD, Bangladesh Bank, 2005.
Measures Adopted for Reduction of NPLs in Bangladesh
Bangladesh has adopted many punitive measures to curb and recover nonperforming 
loans. Hence, it is important to discuss all these measures adopted for better policy 
framework and effective management of NPLs. The measures are summarized in Table 
11, below. 
Table 11 Measures Adopted for reduction of NPLs in Bangladesh
Name of Measure NPL Management Guidelines
National Commission on Money 
Exchange and Credit, 1986
??? Suggests administrative and judicial steps for overcoming problems of overdue 
loans of DFIs and NCBs.
??? Measures undertaken: setting of recovery targets for NCBs and DFIs, prohibiting 
defaulters from access to further credit, linking loan recovery measures with the 
central bank.
Financial Sector Reform Project 
(FSRP), 1990
??? Suggests an overall improvement in the debt recovery environment. Enacts differ-
ent laws and regulations for enabling speedy the settlement processes.
??? Measures undertaken: enacting a number of new laws, regulations and instru-
ments9 to improve the credit quality of the banking system; ﬁxing targets for col-
lection and resolution of legal cases for the hundred largest defaulters; publishing 
list of the hundred largest defaulters through different media.
Banking Reform Committee, 
1996
??? Suggests formulating a concrete “recovery policy” for the NCBs to address their 
huge NPLs and to verify the feasibility of forming one Asset Management Com-
pany (AMC) for resolving the problem of default loans. 
Banking Reform Committee, 
1996
??? Measures undertaken: formulating recovery cells and recovery camps in NCBs to 
speed up the process of recovery of default loans
??? Introduction of incentives to bank ofﬁcials for the recovery of default loans. 
9 New Loan Laws and Regulations
Screening Monitoring Transparency Lenders recourse
i)
ii)
iii)
iv) 
LRA
CIB
Loans to Insiders and 
Connected Parties
Interest Rate
Deregulation
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
NLLC
LLRS
PPS
Off-site  
Supervision
i)
ii)
Loan Classiﬁcation and 
Provisioning
Risk based Capital 
Adequacy
i)
ii)
Money Loan  
Court Act, 1990
Bankruptcy Act, 1997
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Name of Measure NPL Management Guidelines
Structural Adjustment 
Performance Review Initiative 
(SAPRI), 2000
??? Focuses on improvement of the loan screening and monitoring standard of indi-
vidual banks for curbing default loans. Also proposes wide economic deregulation 
in an environment of feeble and weak enforcement status of prudential laws and 
regulations relating to default loans.
??? Measures undertaken: improving the supervision and regulation of banks by the 
Bangladesh Bank. The government has also enacted the Money Loan Court Act 
2003, and the Bank Company (Amendment) Act 2003 for quick settlement of 
filed cases relating to default loans. Directions were also given by Bangladesh 
Bank to all scheduled banks to maintain a “capital adequacy ratio” equal to 9% of 
risk weighted assets (RWA), with core capital equal to at least 4.5% of RWA. To 
protect depositors’ interests, a provision has also been made to appoint two direc-
tors from the depositors by the central bank.
Credit Risk Grading (CRG) 
Manual, 2005
??? The credit risk grading system was made mandatory from the beginning of 2006 
to analyze the borrowers’ credit risk as well as to prevent fresh NPLs.  In this 
codiﬁed system, if a borrower’s risk falls within the range of 45-54 out of 100, he 
is not allowed to receive credit. Any borrower who has a score above the range of 
45-54 is eligible to receive credits.
Other Measures
??? Banks with net classiﬁed loans of up to ﬁve per cent are allowed to sanction a 
maximum of 56 percent of total loans and advances as “large loans”.
??? Banks with net classiﬁed loans between ﬁve percent and ten percent are allowed 
to lend 52 percent of their portfolio as “large loans”.
??? Banks with net classiﬁed loans between 10 and 15 percent are allowed to lend up 
to 48 percent of their total loans as “large loans”.
??? Banks with net classiﬁed loans of 20 percent and more are allowed to lend a max-
imum of 44 percent of their total loans as “large loans”.
??? The Bangladesh Bank has also advised the banks pursue “syndicated loans” in 
case of large loan amounts.
??? An incentive package for bank officials of NCBs to speed up the recovery of 
default loans. NCB staff receives seven percent of the loan for helping the bank 
to recover any loan which remained unrealized for seven years or more and has 
already been labelled as a “bad debt”. In case of recovery of bad debts that re-
main unrealized for three to seven years, the staff would receive six percent of 
the amount, while they would receive ﬁve percent of the amount as incentive for 
realizing other bad loans. Besides, bank staff would get four percent in case of 
realization of “doubtful loans”. The incentives would be given on an yearly basis 
upon closure of a loan account.
??? “Habitual” defaulters are prohibited from getting any loan rescheduling facility.
??? Bangladesh Bank retains the right to check the transaction of a bank and to im-
pose a penalty if it ﬁnds doubtful transactions and subsequently proves malprac-
tice of the banks.
Summary of ﬁndings and challenges 
The foregoing discussion regarding NPLs in Bangladesh reveals that the banking sector 
of Bangladesh is yet to get out of its NPL mess, although substantial improvement has 
been noticed recently. In terms of adoption of the international loan classiﬁcation and 
provisioning system, Bangladesh follows the international standard (Table 2) to a great 
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extent, but lags far behind with regard to the management of NPLs. At present (2005), 
the banking system of Bangladesh exhibits a very high proportion of NPLs (13.55%) 
when compared to India (5.2%) and Sri Lanka (9.6%). The most dissatisfactory 
performance is seen in the management of “bad loans” which consistently account 
for more than 80% of total NPLs (Table 3). This situation clearly demonstrates the 
inefﬁcacy of the banking system to tackle the “ﬂow problem of bad loans”. Therefore, 
the ﬁrst challenge facing the banking sector of Bangladesh is how to constitute sufﬁcient 
measures to address the ﬂow problem of bad loans effectively.
 It is observed that among the different clusters of banks in Bangladesh, 
NCBs and DFIs continue to have an alarming amount of NPLs (21.35% and 34.87% 
respectively in 2005) since the adoption of prudential norms in 1990.  Although it is 
not clear which sectors contain major NPLs, available data indicates that the highest 
ratio of NPLs are in the category of micro and agricultural loans of both NCBs and 
DFIs (47.09% and 39.20% respectively), followed by term loans having a maturity of 
more than 5 years in the case of DFIs (Table 6).  The NPL ratio of term loans given by 
NCBs is also observed to be very high (Table 6). Another important observation is the 
gradual reduction of capital in NCBs due to maintenance of poor loan loss provisions 
against default loans (Table 8). These aspects clearly call for ending the operation of 
NCBs and DFIs. However, it needs to be mentioned here that the stock markets of 
Bangladesh are not efficient enough to channel funds for industrial growth, and thus 
NCBs as well as DFIs play a vital role in meeting the overall industrial credit needs of 
the country. Hence, the second challenge before the banking system is to decide whether 
to stop operations of the NCBs and DFIs, to privatize them, or to reorient them through 
ﬁnancial engineering.
The study reveals the dissatisfactory performance of the courts (Money loan 
Court, Bankruptcy Court and PDR Court) in terms of rate of settlement of NPL disputes 
as well as rate of recovery of loans over the years in review (Tables 9 & 10). The main 
problem related to very low recovery lies in the very slow execution of the decrees. 
The Financial Sector Reform Project (FSRP) argues that the huge loan delinquency of 
the Bangladesh banking system reﬂects, among other things, the weakness of the legal 
infrastructure, which cannot ensure lenders’ recourse on borrowers. The inefficacy 
on the part of the legal system also sometimes encourages borrowers to refrain from 
paying legitimate dues to the banks. The Center for Policy Dialogue (CPD) Task Force 
Report (2001) also indicates that the main hindrance at this moment in Bangladesh is 
the existing legal framework and its lengthy procedures. However, if the delay in the 
settlement process arises due to the shortage of judges, then separate posts like “Bank 
Magistrates” can be created to settle NPL issues. It is to be kept in mind, however, that 
without having the proper cooperation and sincerity of the concerned individuals, the 
law itself can by no means expedite the process. Thus, the third challenge before the 
banking sector is how to ensure cooperation, sincerity and accountability of the involved 
parties like plaintiff, defendants, lawyers and judges, in order to make the settlement 
process vibrant and speedy.
Concerning recovery strategies, it is observed that Bangladesh has concentrated 
mainly on legal measures to address the NPL issue (Table 11). Unfortunately, these 
legal measures have been found to be very time consuming, resource draining and 
ineffective, and have ultimately resulted in poor recovery performance (Table 9 & 10). 
Interestingly, despite being aware of this fact, the banking system of Bangladesh has 
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barely begun to adopt non-legal measures such as out of court settlements, compromise 
settlement schemes, formation of loan workout departments etc. as operate in India for 
the effective recovery of NPLs. Therefore, the fourth challenge confronting the banking 
sector is how to constitute a concrete NPL management strategy equipped with both 
preventive and resolution measures.
In a bank-centered financial system, it is very crucial to determine whether 
the defaulter is a willful one or a genuine one. In the case of the former, if timely and 
adequate measures are not taken and problems are left unresolved, the willful defaulters 
can have a psychological impact on good borrowers, acting as a catalyst to financial 
degradation. In fact, in developing countries like Bangladesh, a large number of willful 
defaulters operate in the financial market, trying to degrade the credit environment 
either by window-dressing their ﬁnancial health or by inﬂuencing the bank management 
through vested groups, or both. In many reports (BRC, SAPRI, CPD), serious concerns 
have been shown about the presence of willful defaulters in Bangladesh and it has been 
suggested that loan facilities should not be offered to this group. Nevertheless, in reality, 
the banking system has not yet come up with any effective strategies to identify the 
habitual defaulters and to take action against them. In this regard, a prominent challenge 
before the banking sector could be seen as how to develop speciﬁc tools and techniques 
to distinguish the willful defaulters from the genuine ones.
Almost a decade ago, the banking system of Bangladesh adopted a lending risk 
analysis (LRA) device – a prescribed manual given by FSRP for analyzing loans of Tk. 
10 million and above – with the objective of gauging the intensity of risk associated with 
large loans and to choose loan proposals with low risk exposures. LRA has now been 
superseded by the “credit risk grading system” for better identiﬁcation and management 
of borrower’s risk. However, the application of this sophisticated technique (CRG) as 
a credit screening and monitoring tool largely depends on sufﬁcient business data and 
know-how of the concerned credit ofﬁcials. Surprisingly, these are seen to be very poor 
in the credit environment of this country. Thus, the appropriate authorities should pay 
proper heed to redressing these problems to ensure meaningful application of the CRG 
device in the credit environment of Bangladesh. 
After the financial crisis of 1997, the East Asian countries (China, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Indonesia) realized that asset management companies can play a vital 
role in addressing the bad loan problem and can ensure robust financial discipline. 
Recently, India has set up an asset management company as a trust to reorganize 
their bad loans. India has also instituted “factoring devices” and “asset securitisation 
techniques” to remove NPLs from the balance sheet of a bank. In Bangladesh, however, 
no initiative has been taken so far towards the formation of an asset management 
company which could undertake activities relating to asset reconstruction and develop 
markets for distressed assets. Factoring devices and securitisation techniques are 
hardly ever employed for the removal of NPLs in Bangladesh. Therefore, the next 
challenge before the banking sector is how to set up an asset management company or 
institute factoring services and asset securitisation techniques that would address NPLs 
effectively without generating moral hazards.
This study reveals that the highest loan defaults are in the category of micro 
and agricultural credits, followed by term loans / large loans having maturity of 5 years 
and more than 5 years (Table 6). To resolve this issue, the loan syndication technique 
might be considered as an effective ﬁnancial tool. However, proper application of this 
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technique requires cooperation, sincerity and transparency among banks, practices 
which are seen to be absent in the country at present. Moreover, bankers have been 
observed to engage in unhealthy competition in the market.  Therefore, another issue 
is how to exercise syndicated financing technique minimizing unhealthy competition 
among banks in Bangladesh. 
Finally, maintenance of an ethical standard in the banking profession from 
all concerns can be viewed as an important means for making the credit environment 
credible and vibrant. Ethics contributes a great deal to fair practices of lending when law 
itself becomes impotent due to invisible contingencies. Hence, the importance of ethics 
in ﬁnancial institutions should not be overlooked. 
Concluding remarks
More than 15 years have passed since the adoption of prudential norms in the banking 
system of Bangladesh in 1990. Unfortunately, the banking system is still burdened with 
an alarming amount of NPLs and lags far behind the neighboring countries of India and 
Sri Lanka.  Although Bangladesh has to a large degree adopted international standards 
of loan classiﬁcation and provisioning, the management of NPLs is found ineffective, 
as the system has failed to arrest fresh NPLs signiﬁcantly. It needs to be mentioned that 
management of NPLs must be multi-pronged, with different strategies pursued at the 
different stages through which a credit facility passes. Measures should be in place for 
both prevention and resolution. With regard to preventive measures, emphasis needs 
to be placed on credit screening, loan surveillance and loan review functionaries both 
at individual bank levels and in the central bank of the country. Resolution measures 
must be accompanied by legal measures, i.e. improving the efﬁciency of the legal and 
the judicial system and developing other out of the court settlement measures like 
compromise settlement schemes, incentive packaging, formation of asset management 
companies, factoring, asset securitisation and so on. Unfortunately, Bangladesh is 
found to be very weak from the above point of view, and strictly speaking, it has mainly 
concentrated on a few legal measures that have also been found to be ineffective. 
Therefore, this study has highlighted some challenges, shown below, for improving the 
debt recovery environment and solving the NPL problems of the country as well.
? To institute sufficient measures to address the flow problem of bad loans 
effectively.
?To decide whether to stop operations of the NCBs and DFIs, to privatize them, or 
to reorient them through ﬁnancial engineering.
? To ensure cooperation, sincerity and accountability of involved parties such as 
plaintiffs, defendants, lawyers and judges to make the settlement process vibrant 
and speedy.
?To institute immediately a concrete NPL management strategy equipped with both 
preventive and resolution measures.
?To develop speciﬁc tools and techniques to distinguish the willful defaulters from 
the genuine ones.
?To pay proper attention to addressing problems relating to meaningful application 
of the CRG device in the credit environment of Bangladesh. 
? To establish an asset management company or to institute factoring services as 
well as asset securitisation technique so as to address NPLs effectively without 
? ?? ?
generating moral hazards.
? To exercise syndicated financing technique for large loans and to minimize 
unhealthy competition among banks in Bangladesh.
?To strengthen the supervisory and monitoring functions of Bangladesh Bank so as 
to discipline banks that engage in malpractice.
? Finally, to place emphasis on ethical standards in the banking profession from all 
corners to make the credit environment trustworthy and vibrant.
References
Ahmed, Shahabuddin. 1998. “Ethics in Banking,” The First Nurul Matin Memorial 
Lecture, May 6, Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management, Dhaka. Unpublished.
Asian Development Bank. 2003. Regional and Country Highlights - Sri Lanka.
Bangladesh Bank. 1991. Loan Classiﬁcation Manual.
Bangladesh Bank. 2003. Annual Report, 2002-2003. 
Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management (BIBM). 2000. Studies in Bangladesh 
Banking: Series 1, BIBM, June: 67.
Bank of Japan. 2002. “Japan’s Nonperforming Loan Problem,” Bank of Japan Quarterly 
Bulletin, November: 1-8.
Bank of Thailand. 2003. “NPLs Outstanding- Classiﬁed by Financial Institution Group”, 
<http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/databank/Financial_Institutions/Npl/Npl_Menu_E.
htm> (accessed 25 August 2006).
Bank of Indonesia. 2003. “Banking Indicators.” 
< h t t p : / / w w w. b i . g o . i d / w e b / e n / I n d i k a t o r + M o n e t e r + d a n + P e r b a n k a n /
Indikator+Perbankan/> (accessed 25 August 2006). 
Bank Perdagangan. 2003. “Commercial Banks: Outstanding Loan Provisions and 
Nonperforming Loans,” <www.bnm.gov.my/files/publications> (accessed 25 August 
2006). 
Banking Regulation and Policy Department, Bangladesh Bank. BCD and PRPD 
Circulars, 1989-2001.
Bernanke, Ben and Lown, Cara. 1991. “The Credit Crunch.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 2: 204-248.
Berseghuan, Levon. 2003. “Nonperforming Loans, Prospective Bailouts and Japan’s 
Slowdown”. Working Paper, Northwestern University, March 30.
Bery, Suman K. 1996. “India: Commercial Bank Reform.” In Financial Sector Reforms, 
Economic Growth and Stability: Experiences in Selected Asian and Latin American 
Countries, ed. Farqui, Shakhil. EDI Seminar Series, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Bhattacharya, Debapriya and Choudhury, T. A. 2002. “Financial Sector Reforms in 
Bangladesh: The Next Round.” Paper presented at a seminar organized by FBCCI and 
CPD, April 16, 2002. Unpublished. 
Bhattacharya, Debapriya and Rashed M. Titumir. 2000. “Implications of Financial 
Sector Reform,” CPD Occasional Paper Series, 21, May: 71-89.
Blejer, Mario I., Feldman, Ernesto V. and Feltenstein, Andrew. 2002. “Exogenous 
Shocks, Contagion, and Bank Soundness: A Macroeconomic Framework,” Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 21: 33-53. 
Bonin, P. John, Huang, Yiping. 2001. “Dealing with the Bad Loans of the Chinese 
Banks,” Journal of Asian Economics, 12: 197-214. 
? ?? ?
Cargill, Thomas F. and Parker, Elliot. 2004. “Price Deflation, Money Demand, and 
Monetary Policy Discontinuity: A Comparative view of Japan, China, and the United 
States,” The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 15 (1): 125-147.
Central Bank of China. 2005. “Nonperforming Loan Ratios of Domestic Banks,” 
<http://www.cbc.gov.tw/EngHome/Ebankexam/Statistics/ratios.doc> (accessed 25 
August 2006).
Central Bank of Philippines. 2003. “Selected Asset Quality Indicators”.  <http://www.
bsp.gov.ph/banking/pbs_ﬁles/table19.htm>.
Choudhury, T. Ahmed and Moral, L.H. 1999. “Commercial Bank Restructuring in 
Bangladesh: From FSRP to BRC/ CBRP,” Bank Parikrama, March: 22-31.
Choudhury, T. Ahmed and Adhikary, B. Kumar. 2002. “Loan Classiﬁcation, Provisioning 
Requirement and Recovery Strategies: A comparative Study on Bangladesh and India,” 
Seminar Paper, Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management, January: 21-54.
World Bank. 2002. “Bank Loan Classification and Provisioning Practices in Selected 
Developed and Emerging Countries,” Papers presented at Finance Forum, June. 
Unpublished.
Fukui, Toshihiko. 2003. “Toward the Further Enhancement of Financial Services in 
Japan.” Speech given at the Council for Financial Innovation, Tokyo, 4 November. 
Unpublished.
Government of Bangladesh. 1986. National Commission Report on Money, Banking 
and Credit. June.
Hanazaki, Masaharu and Horiuchi, Akiyoshi. 2002. “A Review of Japan’s Bank Crisis 
from the Governance Perspectives,” Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal, 11(3): 305-325.
Hoshino, Yuta. 2002. “Economic Perspective and Accounting Issues of Japanese Banks’ 
Nonperforming Loans,” A paper undertaken as Visiting Scholar at School of Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, February. Unpublished. <http://
www.soas.ac.uk/departments/departmentinfo.cfm?navid=437>. 
International Monetary Fund. 2003. “Country Report No. 03/194,” June.
Kitamura, Toshiharu. 2003. “What behind Japan’s bad Loans.” Part I, Financial Affairs, 
April. <http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/summary_0199-141225_ITM>.
Klingebiel, Daniela.  2000. “The Use of Asset Management Companies in the 
Resolution of Banking Crises: Cross County Experience.” World Bank Working Paper, 
April.
Kwack, Sung Yeung. 2000. “An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Determining the 
Financial Crisis in Asia,” Journal of Asian Economics, 11(2): 195-206.
Islam, Muinul and Moral, Liakat. 1999. “Bank Loan Default Problem in Bangladesh: A 
dialogue Between Borrowers and Lenders.” Keynote paper (seminar paper) presented at 
Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management, published in Bank Parikrama, May: 22-31, 
35-37.
Mahmud, Wahid Uddin et.al. 2001. “Taskforce Report on Financial sectors Reforms”. 
Bank Parikrama, March: 77-129.
Moral, Liakat and Islam, Siddique. 2000. “Enforcement Status of Laws Relating 
to Defaulted Bank Loans”. Seminar paper of BIBM, published in Bank Parikrama, 
September: 13-27. 
Muniappan, G.P. 2002. “The NPA Overhang- Magnitude, Solutions, Legal Reforms.” 
Paper presented at CII Banking Summit, Mumbai, April: 25-26. Unpublished.
Rahman, M. Habibur. 1999. “Ethics in Banking.” The Second Nurul Matin Memorial 
? ?? ?
Lecture, BIBM, July 11, Dhaka. Unpublished.
Rangarajan, C. and Narendra, J. 1992. Issues in Financial Sector Reform, The Indian 
Economy: Problem and Prospects. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing.
Reserve Bank of India. “Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 1997-2005”, <http://
www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=Trend+and+Progress+of+Bankin
g+in+India>. 
Shiozaki, Yasuhisa. 2002. “Can Japan’s Ailing Banking System be Cured?” Paper 
presented at the Japan Society, New York, 2 May 2002. Unpublished.
Syeduzzaman, M. 2001. “Ethics in Banking,” Bank Parikrama, June:  83-103. 
Sinkey, Joseph F. 1999. Commercial Bank Financial Management. New York: Prentice 
Hall.
Woo, David. 2000. “Two Approaches to Resolving Nonperforming Assets during 
Financial Crisis.” IMF working paper 00/33, March: 2-5.
Yanagisawa, Hakuo. 2001. “Japan’s Financial Sector Reform: Progress and Challenges”. 
Paper presented at World Financial Center, London, September 3. Unpublished.
